Between ASEAN And EU: Which Model Of Integration Better Handles Relationship With The US?

Commentary by Professor Ruhanas Harun, National Defense University and Professor Phar Kim Beng, International Islamic University of Malaysia 

KUALA LUMPUR, June 4 (Bernama) -- In an increasingly fragmented world order, regional blocs are no longer just economic arrangements or platforms for political cooperation—they are geopolitical buffers, bargaining platforms, and identity anchors.

The European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represent two contrasting yet enduring models of regional integration. Both have had to navigate complex and often asymmetric relationships with the United States (US).

But which model is better equipped to manage, hedge, or leverage this relationship in an era of strategic rivalry and global flux?

The EU model: rule-based assertiveness

The European Union was born out of the ashes of war, built on the explicit desire to institutionalise peace, economic interdependence, and shared sovereignty. With its robust legal framework, single market, common currency (for most members), and supranational institutions, the EU is often seen as the gold standard of regionalism.

This cohesion has given it the confidence to stand up to the US when necessary.

From challenging Washington over trade disputes at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to opposing the 2003 Iraq War to regulating Big Tech, the EU has asserted its autonomy with remarkable consistency.

More recently, in the wake of the Trump administration's unilateralism, the EU pursued “strategic autonomy”—an effort to reduce its dependency on American security guarantees and diversify its trade and digital dependencies.

This assertiveness stems from structural strength: the EU speaks with one voice in trade negotiations, can impose sanctions collectively, and increasingly frames itself as a “normative power.”

However, this very structure also creates internal friction. Disagreements between Eastern and Western European states on issues like Russia, China, and migration often stall or dilute EU policy.

Moreover, the EU’s strategic autonomy remains largely aspirational. It still depends heavily on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)—a US-led alliance—for military security. In that sense, the EU’s capacity to handle relations with the US is tempered by its own structural contradictions and the slow pace of consensus-building.

The ASEAN model: flexible autonomy

ASEAN, by contrast, is an exemplar of minimalist institutionalism. Founded in 1967 amid Cold War rivalries, it has grown into a bloc of ten countries which may soon include Timor-Leste and possibly Papua New Guinea. ASEAN is united more by norms than by laws.

The “ASEAN Elan”—characterised by consensus, non-interference, and informality—has enabled the region to maintain cohesion despite wide developmental, political, and cultural differences.

This flexibility is ASEAN’s key asset in dealing with the United States. Unlike the EU, ASEAN has never sought to confront the US but rather to embed it within regional multilateralism.

Through initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), ASEAN has positioned itself as an honest broker.

The US engages ASEAN multilaterally without demanding conformity, and ASEAN benefits from this engagement without formal alignment.

Yet this strategic ambiguity comes at a cost.

ASEAN’s consensus model makes it difficult to respond decisively to external pressures. During the Trump administration, ASEAN was cautious—often silent—on tariffs, trade wars, or America’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017.

And as the US-China rivalry intensifies, ASEAN’s neutrality is increasingly tested, especially in the South China Sea.

But if ASEAN can be flexible towards the US, it has to learn how to accommodate the rise of China too, to benefit from a working relationship with China without headbutting with Beijing on a regular basis, which could be pointless due to the asymmetry of power.

Comparative resilience in a polarised era

When assessing which model is better suited to handle relations with the US, one must consider the nature of American power today.

The US remains a military and technological juggernaut, but it is also an unpredictable actor.

The oscillation between engagement and retreat—from Obama to Trump to Biden, and potentially back to Trump—makes stable relations difficult to maintain.

The flexibility of ASEAN is less harmful to the regional consolidation of ASEAN, whereas the EU's confrontational approach risks antagonising the US altogether, leading the US to want to divide and conquer it altogether.

The EU’s strength lies in its institutional depth and regulatory power, enabling it to engage the US from a position of parity in trade and norms.

However, its geopolitical reliance on Washington remains unchanged. As and when the EU challenges the US, the EU invites internal rancour.

Meanwhile, ASEAN’s strength lies in its agility, allowing it to adapt without provoking.

Yet, its lack of institutional robustness means it often punches below its weight in strategic negotiations. This is fine since the US can exempt some semiconductor exports that the US badly needs. The US imports up to 20 per cent of Malaysia's semiconductors and circuit boards.

Strategic caution versus strategic autonomy

ASEAN's approach can be defined as strategic caution—cultivating ties with all major powers while avoiding dependence on any single one.

This has allowed ASEAN to maintain economic ties with China while embracing US military engagement. It’s a fine balancing act that works as long as the US does not demand loyalty and China does not punish neutrality.

The EU, on the other hand, seeks strategic autonomy—developing independent capabilities in defence, digital policy, and supply chains. Yet, as the Ukraine war has shown, when crisis strikes, Europe still turns to Washington for leadership and logistics.

Conclusion: Complementary lessons, not competition

Rather than asking which model is superior, perhaps a better question to ask is: what can these models learn from each other too?

ASEAN can learn from the EU’s normative clarity and institutional accountability. A stronger secretariat, clearer mechanisms for dispute resolution, and a collective economic voice could bolster ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific.

It requires the future ASEAN Secretariat to have more intellectual depth. Right now, this seems to be lacking on all fronts.

Conversely, the EU could benefit from ASEAN’s diplomatic pragmatism. Its ability to convene, de-escalate, and maintain channels with adversaries is precisely what the polarised world needs.

At a time when the US is both a partner and a pressure point, the EU and ASEAN offer different but necessary approaches.

Together, they show that regionalism, whether rooted in law or norms, remains essential in navigating great power politics.

-- BERNAMA

(The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of BERNAMA)