Malaysia Balances Legal Rights With Diplomacy As Strait Of Hormuz Blockade Tests UNCLOS

By Harizah Hanim Mohamed

KUALA LUMPUR, April 16 (Bernama) – Malaysia’s ability to negotiate with Iran to secure safe passage for its crude oil imports through the vital Strait of Hormuz is not indicative of a failure of the principles of international maritime law, but rather reflects the reality that rights under law often require diplomatic backing, said a logistics expert.

“Both legal principles and diplomatic engagement are necessary, especially under exceptional circumstances such as during a conflict,” Prof Dr Muhammad Zaly Shah, president of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport Malaysia (CILTM), told Bernama.

These two concepts – the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and diplomatic efforts - are not mutually exclusive, he said.

Malaysia’s direct engagement with Iran

What transpired reflects pragmatic decision-making in practice, when Malaysia’s Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim contacted Iran’s President directly to secure clearance for stranded tankers, he said.

“That right of transit passage is legitimate. However, enforcing that right during a conflict, especially against a non-party to UNCLOS, is a different matter. There is neither a maritime police force nor an international court capable of compelling immediate compliance,” he said.

Malaysia signed UNCLOS when it was opened for signature in 1982 and ratified it on Oct 14, 1996.

Muhammad Zaly, who is also director of Universiti Teknologi Malaysia’s Research Institute for Sustainable Environment, said that in principle, pursuant to Article 38 of UNCLOS, transit passage through international straits is a right that may not be suspended or conditioned.

The concern comes amid reports of vessel tolls by Iran and a US announcement of a blockade targeting maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, further complicating the application of transit passage principles under UNCLOS.

International Malaysian Society of Maritime Law (IMSML) treasurer Abdul Azim Abd Razak concurred, saying that governments typically need to supplement legal rights with diplomacy, coordination and practical risk management.

“Malaysia has historically supported free navigation and unimpeded transit. It would likely reject any attempt to impose tolls or conditions for mere passage, as this would be inconsistent with UNCLOS,” he added.

It was reported that two of seven Malaysia-linked vessels were cleared by Iran to transit the Strait of Hormuz following high-level engagement and diplomatic efforts, with Iran reportedly stating that it “does not forget its friends”.

On whether Malaysia’s actions risk setting a precedent where strait access becomes negotiable rather than guaranteed, Muhammad Zaly said the issue is of interest to maritime law practitioners in the current context.

He said Malaysia managed the situation by affirming its commitment to freedom of navigation under international law while engaging diplomatically to secure passage.

“Obtaining toll-free passage demonstrates the benefits of bilateral ties. However, there is an inherent structural issue: whenever you negotiate to obtain something that already exists as a legal right, it sends a signal that the right is, de facto, not self-executing,” he said.

He cautioned that if this pattern is repeated frequently across states, the boundary between a legal right and a negotiated privilege may gradually erode.

“While this may not happen dramatically in policy terms, such erosion nevertheless carries long-term significance,” he added.

Precedent risks and Strait of Malacca implications

Looking from Malaysia’s standpoint as a littoral state to the Strait of Malacca, he said Malaysia, as a co-manager of one of the world’s most significant maritime routeways (handling approximately one-quarter of global trade), would be directly affected if global norms shift toward allowing strait states discretion over transit conditions.

“The universal applicability of this principle is essential; otherwise, it applies nowhere,” he said.

As of early 2026, the Strait of Malacca is a major chokepoint for global oil and container trade, handling an estimated 23.2 million barrels of oil per day and accounting for about 29 per cent of global maritime oil flows, making it the world’s busiest oil chokepoint.

The strait links the Indian and Pacific Oceans and serves as the shortest sea route between the Middle East and key markets in East and Southeast Asia, with over 70 per cent of this traffic consisting of crude oil bound for China, Japan, and South Korea.

On the question of risk to the Strait of Malacca if similar situations arise, Muhammad Zaly said Malaysia should respond promptly and firmly using both diplomatic and legal mechanisms.

“Malaysia would cite Article 26 of UNCLOS, refer to long-standing cooperative management arrangements among Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore and would likely face scrutiny from major trading partners including China, Japan, India, the United States and the European Union, all of whom rely heavily on the strait for commercial flows,” he said.

He added that UNCLOS provisions on transit passage were among the most difficult to negotiate during its nine-year drafting process.

“These provisions were designed specifically to prevent strait states from holding international navigation hostage. What appears to be unfolding today through bilateral arrangements, toll discussions, and case-by-case clearance is effectively the opposite of what UNCLOS intended,” he said.

Such a trend, he added, would represent a significant setback not only for maritime law but also for the rules-based international order that Malaysia has consistently supported.

-- BERNAMA